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Remarks

For
Executive Secretary
26 Jul 85

Date

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Executive Registry
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26 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa
Chief, Africa Division, DO

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: South Africa

We had a good meeting which did not focus entirely on South Africa's internal problems and resulting legislative problems here. The Southern Africa problem was aired by me and Weinberger which we will follow up with a letter to the CPPG to assess where we are on that and whether we should consider shifting gears. I would like Fred to draft such a letter with Monty's help using the talking points, particularly the last page as something to look at with greater emphasis on the value of pressure from UNITA in inducing the MPLA to be receptive to reconciliation talks.



William J. Casey



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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

NIC #03810-85/1
30 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Frederick L. Wattering
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Proposed CPPG Meeting on Southern Africa

REFERENCE: DCI memo to Multiple Addressees, dtd 26 July 85,
Subject: South Africa

1. Attached is a proposed memorandum to Bud McFarlane for your signature calling for a CPPG meeting on southern Africa as you requested.

2. The proposed memo has been coordinated with [] and his division who contributed to it and concurred, with the following exception: With regard to agreeing to a Savimbi visit to the US, [] questions whether the time is appropriate for a public embrace of Savimbi. He recommends senior USG officials meet with Savimbi either in Jamba, Angola, or in Europe. (I disagree. Given the 1981 precedent, I see no reason a Savimbi Washington visit hurts us, and it meets a major Savimbi grievance against us. The memo reflects my view.)

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Frederick L. Wattering
Frederick L. Wattering

Attachment:
As stated

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #03810-85

JUL 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Proposed CPPG Meeting on Southern Africa

1. I believe there is a need for the Crisis Pre-Planning Group to examine some of the specific policies and tactics applicable to the southern Africa region. While the 26 July NSC meeting underscored continuing consensus on the broad policy objectives towards South Africa and southern Africa, some of the specific applications of these broad objectives seem to make a questionable contribution to the overall policy objectives. [REDACTED]

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2. Policies of the past four years have led us to support a Marxist government in Mozambique against a growing insurgency which controls most of the country and to jeopardize the popular leader of an insurgency against a Communist government in Angola in order to accelerate a political process in Namibia which is likely to install a Marxist government there. [REDACTED]

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3. Specifically, in Angola, the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops would result in the collapse of the MPLA government and a victory for Savimbi. Thus, the MPLA, the Soviet Union, and Cuba will not go for any such deal. The latest version of our proposal--a somewhat exiguous plan for an extended Cuban withdrawal over three years, referred to as "the synthesis"--has been rejected by the MPLA, UNITA, and South Africa (as well as Cuba and the Soviet Union). Incredibly, the blame for the impasse has passed from the Communists to the South Africans, which is against our intention and interest. [REDACTED]

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4. There is broad agreement in the Intelligence Community that the only pressure capable of moving the MPLA into dealing with Savimbi and dispensing with its Cuban guardians is greatly increased military pressure from UNITA. [REDACTED]

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5. The SWAPO movement, the likely beneficiary of a Namibia settlement, appears increasingly weakened by inter- and intra-tribal conflicts and by military defeats, but its ties to the Soviet Bloc appear even stronger. Meanwhile, South African attempts to construct a moderate political grouping in Namibia capable of challenging SWAPO in any election remain unsupported except for some modest, nonofficial West German assistance. [REDACTED]

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6. In Mozambique, a recent SNIE noted that the insurgent RENAMO movement would continue to drive the Machel regime into smaller and smaller islands of control over the next year. [REDACTED]

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7. I believe the CPPG should examine new policy options for the southern Africa region. I would suggest the following be among the options examined:

- Shift our diplomatic efforts from Cuban troop withdrawal in Angola to proposals for reconciliation meetings between MPLA and UNITA, as both Savimbi and the South Africans have encouraged us to do. While the MPLA would likely resist this at first, it would again return the world focus on MPLA inflexibility rather than South Africa's, and could provide a framework for actual talks should increased pressure from Savimbi broaden the limited sentiment for talks extant within the MPLA.
- Make an all-out effort to repeal the Clark Amendment. While much has been done on this, repeal is not yet in hand and every effort should be made to avoid slippage. If the Amendment is successfully repealed, our diplomats will have an additional "stick" to pressure MPLA toward reconciliation.

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[REDACTED]
SECRET [REDACTED]

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- Rather than sending new missions to Luanda with new formulations on Cuban withdrawal--moves which discomfort and weaken Savimbi and produce no results--should we not wait for battlefield pressures to move the MPLA to come to us? We should not categorically exclude ourselves from contacts with the MPLA, however.
- Reopen our mission in Windhoek, Namibia, both as a listening post and in order to give some recognition to non-Communist, moderate political forces inside Namibia. We might consider looking at ways and means of encouraging support to such forces. [REDACTED]

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/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey

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[REDACTED]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03793-85

29 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Frederick L. Wetters *FLW*
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Additional Talking Points on USSR and the
Situation in South Africa

1. While I do not disagree with the talking points forwarded to you on Friday, 26 July (in my absence), I believe they somewhat understated Soviet influence on and attempts to influence the situation in South Africa. I would add the following to those forwarded:

- The USSR is deploying all its assets to influence the Free World to support the ANC. This includes: Soviet-controlled international front organizations, various UN organizations accessible to Soviet influence; Third World groupings such as the Organization for Africa Unity, which can be influenced through Soviet allies and clients; West European Communist parties under Soviet control, which are heavily involved in supporting the ANC; as well as direct Soviet pressure on individual states to give support to the ANC.
- The ANC is effectively controlled by the SACP whose members dominate ANC finances, propaganda, intelligence, training, education, and military operations.
- The Soviet Union uses its diplomatic missions in neighboring states (of South Africa) to provide guidance and support to ANC operations, including terrorist operations.
- The USSR will continue to support SACP domination of the ANC, helping their surrogates to defeat any attempts by more nationalist elements to move into authority within the ANC.

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- In addition to the SACP/ANC line of attack, I believe we should also count the extensive Soviet support to SWAPO as an oblique attack on South Africa. The Soviets have little intrinsic interest in Namibia--underpopulated, poor land, and largely desert--other than as a springboard for SACP/ANC subversion into South Africa. The Soviets (and Soviet Bloc) provide essentially the same forms of support to SWAPO as they do to the ANC. While there is no Communist party within SWAPO, the SWAPO leadership appears increasingly dominated by pro-Soviet elements, including SWAPO military figures trained in the USSR.




Frederick L. Wettering

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SECRETNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

July 25, 1985

Via LDX

SECRETSYSTEM II
90760**MEMORANDUM FOR**

MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

**OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY**
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH
Senior Special Assistant
to the Attorney General
Department of Justice

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BG GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, Friday, July 26, 1985 (C)

A National Security Council Meeting on U.S. - South Africa relations, focussing principally on the internal situation in South Africa and the southern Africa regional peace process, is scheduled for Friday, July 26, 1985, from 10:00 AM to 11:00 AM in the Cabinet Room. (S)

Attached is a State Department background paper on the issues, and an agenda for the meeting. (U)

William F. Martin
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary


Attachments

Tab A State Background Paper
Tab B Agenda

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Tab A



SECRET/SENSITIVESOUTHERN AFRICA STATUS REPORTI. GLOBAL/REGIONAL POLICY

U.S. policy in southern Africa is part of the President's firm intention to increase our influence where we are in competition with the Soviets, while at the same time turning back the gains made by the Soviets in Africa in the 1970s and establishing a firm basis for our relations with the continent. Our objectives are to: (1) accelerate movement away from apartheid in South Africa, (2) lessen regional violence, (3) achieve Namibian independence under UNSCR. 435, (4) bring about the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and (5) help achieve peace in Mozambique and further move that country away from Soviet influence. The alternative is continued turmoil, which the Soviets readily exploit.

Until recent South African actions, cross-border violence had been dramatically reduced due to the U.S.-brokered Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa and the Lusaka Agreement between Angola and South Africa. Similarly, there has been forward movement on Namibian independence, including the commitment of all parties to Resolution 435 and Angolan acceptance of the need for Cuban troop withdrawal. Our efforts of the past four years culminated last March in the presentation to both the Angolans and South Africans of a "synthesis" of the positions of both sides designed to focus the talks on a single document. Our "synthesis" provides for the withdrawal of 24,000 Cuban troops from Angola during the first year, with the remaining 6,000 restricted to north of the 13th parallel and withdrawn during the second year.

Our approach proceeds from the assumptions that South Africa and Angola cannot achieve security without a negotiated settlement. Angola in particular has steadily lost ground to Savimbi over the past two years, even though there is little likelihood the MPLA will be overwhelmed in its Cuban-supported urban bastions. South Africa cannot escape from its costly Namibian war and advance its international prospects absent a settlement. It has further been our assumption that an agreement on Cuban withdrawal will force Luanda to come to terms with UNITA. Savimbi fully understands our approach and has no other to offer. We have no basis to force power-sharing in the absence of a breakthrough in the negotiations. These assumptions remain as valid today as in the past--there will be no peace without US diplomatic involvement.

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Recent South African behavior has raised serious questions whether the SAG is still committed to the peace process or whether it may be using it as camouflage for other, more violent, scenarios. A decision to proceed with an "interim government" in Namibia was shortly followed by an abortive SA raid against Gulf Oil facilities in Cabinda, an argumentative and negative response to our March "synthesis" on Cuban troop withdrawal, and a hot-pursuit raid against SWAPO units in southern Angola on June 28. There is evidence that the SAG has sought to disinform Jonas Savimbi about the true substance of the US "synthesis." On June 14, South African commandos raided ANC targets in Gaborone, and the SAG reasserted its right to do so wherever, in its judgment, a government failed to act on its own. This pattern of negative actions raises serious questions; it is imperative we test whether SAG moves are an aberration or a strategic shift.

In Mozambique, Machel has expelled hundreds of ANC guerrillas and made steps toward the West in many political and economic areas. He has also carried out his pledge to us to deny direct military basing or access to the Soviets and is moving cautiously away from Mozambique's Marxist economic system. However, our efforts are seriously hindered by the continuing RENAMO insurgency, which South Africa substantially resupplied before the signing of Nkomati. However, after initial ambiguity, the Botha government is now firmly supporting Machel. The British are providing modest military support to Mozambique, and our Western allies are helping economically. All parties, including South Africa, look to us to do more for Mozambique.

II. SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

The apparent turn towards a more truculent approach regionally is paralleled internally by the determination of the Botha government to signal to its supporters and foes that it will sustain firm control even as it continues to pursue its reform agenda. The result is a situation in which unprecedented change coincides with equally unprecedented and sustained township unrest and ruthless repression. (Since last September, 460 blacks have died, of which 350 were killed by police.) Well aware that the reality of black urbanization has made nonsense of the old pretense that black political participation can be dealt with in the context of rural homelands, the SAG now recognizes that it cannot devise new formulas without consulting with representative blacks but is frustrated to find that its

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acts of repression prevent such dialogue from taking place. Caught in this dilemma, P.W. Botha's response to foreign, including American, criticism has become increasingly testy. As the images of repression blot out the story of reform (which Botha sees himself pursuing to the limit of what his white political traffic can bear), he feels deprived of international credit he thinks he deserves. Convinced that the ANC is manipulating the unrest, he is prepared to crack down hard, international reaction notwithstanding.

The effect has been to add to our problems on the Hill.

III. LEGISLATIVE SITUATION

The present legislative situation revolves around two Congressional initiatives: repeal of the Clark Amendment and South African sanctions. The Senate has voted for a repeal of Clark; we support House action and are assessing with the House leadership prospects for repeal. We failed in the House in 1981 and do not want the President to be embarrassed and the United States weakened by a further defeat. Clark repeal is important as a principle, and it will add pressure on the MPLA. In the short term, however, repeal will shock Luanda and the Africans.

We face South African sanctions legislation in both Houses and have taken a firm position opposing punitive economic measures such as those in the Kennedy-Gray bill that passed the House in June. Measures prohibiting new investment, gold coin imports, bank loans and all computer sales run counter to our foreign policy approach (and the interests of blacks and US firms). They also conflict with world-wide US financial and commercial policy. Senate Republicans, led by Dole and Lugar, have proposed a moderate alternative containing a mix of positive and negative elements. We have not endorsed it but have urged our Senate friends to hold the line and go no further or risk a veto. Prospects are not helped by recent SAG actions as well as domestic violence.

IV. NEXT STEPS

Without a cooperative relationship with the SAG on southern Africa, it will be difficult to advance our regional strategy. Our increasingly worried Allies have no alternative and are watching intently our domestic debates as well as our current, chilled relations with the SAG. The African Front Line States would like us to adopt a far tougher position with the SAG, but they also worry about what happens if we fail to get Pretoria back to the table.

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We are now in the process of testing SAG intentions. In the wake of Ambassador Nickel's recall, we are seeking from Pretoria a serious indication that the SAG is prepared to resume working with us. This would be followed by a meeting at senior levels to pin down a cooperative strategy which keeps the SAG working for a Namibia settlement and a reduction in regional violence. We are making it clear to the SAG that we cannot restore our previous relations in the context of continued unhelpful actions on their part. Ambassador Nickel's return to post will be held back pending further clarity on these points.


If we do not get an early, positive signal from the SAG, we will propose a Presidential letter which argues for cooperation but leaves the SAG under no illusions that, without us, they will face self-destructive isolation. We judge that the recent SAG behavior pattern--including defiant, even unfriendly, attitudes toward Washington--is part bluster. They are more likely to be moved if they see that our resolve is firm, both in sustaining our policy domestically and in achieving our regional goals.

To make these points clear and underscore our interest in internal reform, we support an early Presidential radio broadcast and a speech by the Vice President. The themes would stress the unique relevance of our regional diplomacy, the need for further constructive change that ends black injustice, the case against economic sanctions, and the positive role of our programs supporting black advancement. At the same time, we are also cautioning the Africans (including the ANC) that all parties have responsibilities in controlling violence and reminding them and the SAG of our readiness to play a constructive role in encouraging dialogue.

As for the MPLA in Angola, we are reminding them that they, too, must move if there is to be progress in the negotiations. They, like Pretoria, have no better alternative than the settlement we have on offer. At present, Luanda is confused, off balance, and taken up with military and diplomatic diversions. It is important they not misread signals from South Africa and the US as letting them off the hook.

In sum, we are not yet at the point where hard choices have to be made about the viability of our regional strategy, which has assured Western initiative, reversed Soviet momentum and opened the way toward greater stability these past four years. The overall US posture in Africa and Alliance cohesion on African issues depend in major part on getting the process back on track.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, July 26, 1985

The Cabinet Room

10:00 AM - 11:00 AM

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Agenda

- | | | |
|-------------|----------------------------------|--|
| I. | Introduction | Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes) |
| II. | Intelligence Overview | Director Casey
(5 minutes) |
| III. | South Africa | Deputy Secretary
Whitehead
(15 minutes) |
| | - Internal Reform Process | |
| | - Regional Peace Process | |
| IV. | Discussion | All Participants
(30 minutes) |
| V. | Concluding Comments | Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes) |

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 FROM WILLIAM MARTIN 456-2224
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NSC Meeting
 LOG #: 90760

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<u>K-1</u>	<u>Edward Stuckey</u>	<u>Off of the Exec Sec</u>	
<u>D</u>	<u>Col. David Brown</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
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<u>D</u>	<u>SG. George Gaudin</u>	<u>Exec Asst</u>	<u>GLS</u>

REMARKS

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